p.p1 identify eudaimonia with pleasure, some with honour, and

p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; text-align: justify; font: 10.0px Baskerville; color: #000000; -webkit-text-stroke: #000000}
p.p2 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; text-align: justify; font: 10.0px Baskerville; color: #000000; -webkit-text-stroke: #000000; min-height: 11.0px}
p.p3 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 10.0px Baskerville; color: #000000; -webkit-text-stroke: #000000; min-height: 11.0px}
p.p4 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 10.0px Baskerville; color: #000000; -webkit-text-stroke: #000000}
span.s1 {font-kerning: none}
span.s2 {font: 6.7px Baskerville; font-kerning: none}

A conjunctive position, which lets various other aspects of life into the measure of good, and would allow for anything to be considered within the spectrum of ‘good’ is not plausible. Nor is a disjunctive view about eudaimonia adequate, as it ignores the complex web of functions regulating human life. The ‘highest good’ for man must therefore be measured in terms of that around which all other human functions are organised: reason. 

We Will Write a Custom Essay Specifically
For You For Only $13.90/page!


order now

Aristotle tells us that the ‘highest good’ – eudamonia, is living well (1095a16-21), and for a man to be called eudaimon, this mode of life must be retained throughout his whole life (1100a31-35). 
Aristotle gives popular opinion of what this good life maybe. Some identify eudaimonia with pleasure, some with honour, and the others with virtue (1095b15-30). The first group seeks pleasures in the same way beasts do, and therefore do not employ correctly rationality, the defining ergon of a man. Therefore eudaimoinia canno be equated with this style of living. Those who equates eudaimonia to a life lived in accord with honour, are mistaken on the grounds that honour is bestowed upon them by the opinion and regard of other people, making them dependent on others for their eudaimonia. (1095b22-26). 
A life of virtue, therefore, is the best manifestation of eudaimonia.

This, however, has only added to the qualitative description of what is mean by good, as it only gives us an insight into the defining function of good and restricting the scope of the ‘good pursued in action’ – it does not help us in our breaking down of ‘the highest’ of all the thing good according to the above, which are pursued in action. 

Aristotle continue by stating that, there are three definitive characteristics that eudaimonia (the highest good) must have. By exploring these we will come to the conclusion that not only not anything fits the description, but no more than one thing does. 

First, it must be the most final of all good, which means that there is no good for the sake of which human beings pursue eudaimonia (1097a29-31). Eudaimonia must always be sought for itself, whilst all the other good are sought for the sake of eudaimonia. However this still leaves open the possibility of having more than one final good – indeed, infinite final goods – that are sought only for themselves and never for the sake of each other. 
We need to further limit the scope of eudaimonia. 

At 1097b5-7 Aristotle introduces the concept of completeness, which is an extantion of the above argument based on finality. Eudaimonia must also be the most complete good of all. 
This might seem counter intuitive, when we have just stated than we could, in light of the above criterion alone, the possibility of severral finals goods that have an end in themselves. However Ackrill argues that it is perfectly plausible to admit that even if things have an end in themselves, some are more finals than others. Let me explain how:  A is more final than C if though C is sought for its own sake, it is also sought for the sake of A. 
In other words, if there are two final ends, then this must must necessarily imply that there is one end containing the two. These ends ( C and B) may indeed be sought for their own sake, but both ends are also sought for the sake of this new, most complete end (A).  This end is the most complete end. 
This is why eudamonia is the real final end, because there are plenty of things that we value for themselves, but we say we also value them for the sake of eudamonia, whereas nobody ever aim at eudamonia for the sake of one of them.

Ackrill explains this concept using the analogy of a breakfast: It is best, and better than everything else, not in the way that bacon is better than eggs and than tomatoes (and therefore the best of the three to choose), but in the way that bacon, eggs, and tomatoes is a better breakfast than either bacon or eggs or tomatoes – and is indeed the best breakfast without qualification.

Finally, the last criterion which makes the definition of eudaimonia – the highest good –  only applicable to eudaimonia itself is that of self sufficiency, which states that eudaimonia must not lack anything whose presence would make a man more eudaimon – or a life fare better (1097b14-16). That is, eudamonia must be the full perfect breakfast, and not be lacking a drink, or salt, which might make it a better breakfast. Similarly, a life characterised by eudaimonia could not possibly be any more worth living. 

It follows that the scope of restriction of the definition of ‘the highest of all the good pursued in action’ is narrowed down to eudaimonia alone. Although there might be good ground in the Nicomachean Ethics for doubting this at a first read – the problem with the human ergon, and the counter intruitive nature of the criterion of completeness –  I believe that, given the arguments presented, logically, only one, and no more than one thing – eudaimonia – can fit the description