Does having no evolutionary history I will look at

Does Swampman have beliefs, despite having no evolutionary history?In this essay I aim to outline and explain the Swampman case from Davidson. I will then look at arguments for Swampman having beliefs, despite having no evolutionary history I will look at an objection to this and then aim to look at a reply to the objection before reaching the conclusion that Swampman does not have beliefs.Section One: Explaining Swampman Swampman is an objection to the teleological theory of mental content. Swampman’s aim is to show how the teleological mental theory of naturalising intentionality and mental content is counter intuitive and is also used as a theory against physicalism or at least poses problems for physicalism. Swampman was created by Davidson, Davidson asks us to suppose that lightning strikes a swamp that contains various bits of organic matter, as a result of the lightning striking this organic matter Swampman comes into creation. Swampman is a physical duplicate of Davidson, he shares the same mental states as Davidson. Swampman is completely identical and if he were with Davidson’s friends and family no one would detect Swampman was not the real Davidson. “Friends and family would interpret as witty, interesting and meaningful but (according to teleological theories) Swampman has no ideas about philosophy no perceptions of his surroundings and no beliefs or desires about anything at all” SEP Although Swampman will go on to write Davidson’s papers, and interact with Davidson’s friends and family the same way he would, and it would appear Swampman would be interacting in the same way but actually Swampman won’t be interacting in the same way because he has no causal history. Although Swampman will recognise Davidsons friends as his own he won’t truly be recognising them as he’s never seen them before and it’ll be the first time he’s ever seen them. This therefore is supposed to show that there is more to the world than the physical facts which is what physicalism states. Davidson himself was a physicalist and he proposed that to be able to distinguish whether or not the Swampman has a consciousness by looking and the history of the being. The Swampman has no causal history and has only come into existence mere moments ago thus making it the case that although the being may be able to recognise friends and family and have philosophical discussions and has Davidson’s memories, Davidson says that due to its lack in causal history Swampman and Davidson would not share a conscious. The conflict comes from Swampman’s mental states were not selected for, Swampman has no history, he was simply made from a coincidence, he has no evolutionary history, when Swampman comes into existence he is synchronic – (at a time, but not extended over time). However the intuition for most from Davidson’s Swampman case is that Swampman will have intentionality, intentionality it defined as “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” from the SEPSection Two: Objection to SwampmanTeleosemantic theories would object to the Swampman case and would state that Swampman has no beliefs. Teleosemantic theories explain representation through biological function, example, X has the biological function of Y-ing iff X was naturally selected for Y-ing. i.e seeing is why we have eyes, seeing is the eyes ‘job’ in an evolutionary perspective. Teleosemantic theory reduces intentionality down to the natural biological world, meaning intentionality is framed by the functions of the roles that we play in accordance to other things in nature. Teleosemantics is a naturalistic account of representation. In the Swampman case because Swampmans mental states were not selected for in the sense they have no evolutionary history the teleological argument for representation would then conclude that Swampman does not represent. – Teleological theories of mental content want to explain the contents of mental representations by appealing to a teleological notion of function. For example the thought ‘it is raining’ on a representation theory of thought, this thought involves a representation of rain pouring. – For teleological theories of content, what a representation represents depends on the function of the systems that produce or use the representation. – The aim of teleological theory is to naturalise, which is to give a theory which is consistent with the claim that “the fundamental furniture of the universe is nothing but what the natural sciences describe. Intentionality is not ontologically fundamental, teleological theories are trying to show intentionality is part of the natural world by showing how it can be understood in terms of natural things. ” SEP – The teleological argument would also say that Swampman does not have intentionality Swampman is part of no natural order or process of biology. Swampan is a mere fluke, he has no biological history so then if any thoughts or desires he does have, they can’t be real ones since intentionality comes from the natural world. Swampman isn’t natural and won’t have picked up intentional mental states through a biological history which is where teleological theorists say intentional states comes from. So therefore because Swampman isn’t natural and is purely a fluke he can’t have beliefs, desires or intentional mental states. He wasn’t designed for nor made to be able to have beliefs about things, if Swampman was to think it was ‘raining’ it is not because he knows what rain is an believes it, it will be a false belief, Swampman will have never encountered rain because he has only just come into existence any beliefs he will hold will be false beliefs. He will not really be believing them as he has no experience with any of the things that Davidson had experienced in his life, it is because that belief will also be a fluke like his existence. Section Three: Swamppeople Reply A reply to this argument from the teleological theory is one from David Papineau paper in which he talks about one of his students named Eilbert Sundt-Ohlsen who inspired this reply to the teleological issue with Swampman. This reply is called Swamppeople and the argument is that if as the teleological arguments states Swampman has no intentionality, no desires or mentality etc. then it should follow that it would be morally acceptable to kill Swamppeople for meat. Although the intuition in this case would be that this is in fact wrong. The argument follows that the Swamppeople would be similar to the animals we slaughter for food like pigs and cows, in that we accept they may have conscious sentience of some kind but this doesn’t make it wrong to kill them for food. So, then by this logic we should be fine with the slaughter of Swamppeople for food too. Turning the Swampman case from intuitions to ethics that raise moral issues and concerns, for Papineau this shows that “it seems inescapable that our thinking tracks informational content, rather than selectional content. As Papineau say’s “it is difficult to square this with the teleosemantic thesis that informational content and selectional content are the same thing.” This case highlights some issues with the teleological theory that if are intuitions can be so easily changed about Swampman when we alter the thought experiment, then there must be something wrong with the teleological theory which states that Swampman shares no mental content/ has no intentionality. There must be something they are missing out on in their theory since the idea of eating Swamppeople seems intuititvly wrong, if the teleological theory had captured thing correctly arguably we should not feel intuitively it’s then wrong to eat Swamppeople.It would seem with light of our intuitions from the Swamppeople case that Swampman at the very least has some form of conscience.- Explain here selectional content and informational content Section Four: In favour of Teleoloigcal argument ( Fred Dretske?)A Reply to the above objection of the Swampman and Swamppeople argument is that an appearance of design can be misleading and can allow us to lose track of our intuitions in hypothetical and unrealistic thought experiments. Fred Dretske argues this case, with his own example named Twin-Tercel. Which goes as follows; a Twin-Tercel a random replica of his old Tercel which comes into existence due to a storm in a scrap yard. It is molecule for molecule identical to his old Tercel, except for its “gas-gauge” which does not move like the original in relation to the amount of gas in the tank. Although, we might be tempted to say that the new Tercel is broken Dretske doesn’t agree. He believes that there is no basis for saying it doesn’t work, as it was never made with the intention to work, nor was it designed to do anything. So having intuitions and beliefs about its performance or lack of- simply for looking identical to something that was designed and has a purpose, are misguided intuitions. This case is similar to Swampman case in having an identical of something designed come suddenly into existence and are both now being judged on the basis of what the thing it looks like does. Dretske believes if we should reform our intuitions in one case, then perhaps we should also reform our intuitions in the case of Swampman’s intentionality. Dretske’s point then is by showing a parrall case, it highlights how we might be judging Swampman on abilities he was never supposed to have since he was never designed for anything, he’s a mere fluke and judging him in any other way is bound to lead in complications of our intuitions of complicated hypothetical cases. Section Five: Reply to DretskeAlthough we might grant Dretske the idea behind Twin-Tercel but resist the move from functions to intentionality. Dretske’s argument focuses on an object that’s not seen as functioning as it ought to. Where the crucial difference in the Swampman case is we’re looking at the intentionality of Swampman rather than if he can jump over walls. The Twin-Tercel though has no similairties as a case doesn’t hold up since it doesn’t escape the issues of whether or not Swampman has intentionality. Although I like Drestkse argument I don’t think it does much for the argument of teleological theory, nor does it prove how the Swampman case is an inadequate way the judge teleological theories.