4.1 not materialize, but the Latin American states, in

4.1 Pakistan’s case for membership.   A perusal of the treaty scripts
along with the respective protocols leads one to the conclusion that Pakistan
does not qualify to become part of any of the nuclear? weapon?free zones, with the exception of
Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is mainly due to a common article in the protocols to
the other treaties that bars membership to non? NPT de facto nuclear weapons states. The article
says, “This Protocol shall be open for signature by the People’s Republic of
China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.” A careful scrutiny
of the two sets of Protocols to the Treaties for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (Treaty of Taltelolco), makes it amply
clear that Protocols do not, in any way specify or even, allude to the
condition that only NPT nuclear weapon states can accede to the protocols and
become part of the treaty. Rather than limiting the signature of Protocols to
respective NPT states, its Article 5 of the Protocol 2 to the Treaty states
that, “This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified
it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of
ratification.” By using the word States rather than specifically mentioning the
names of NPT?recognized
nuclear weapons states, the Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and Caribbean provides requisite leeway for non?NPT states to become part of the

Pakistan’s membership in the light of treaties.       The
history of nuclear?weapons?free zone can be traced back to Rapacki Plan of
1958. Rapacki was the foreign minister of Poland, who worked against deployment
of nuclear weapons in Poland, Czechslovakia, West Germany and East Germany.

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Though, the concept of Rapacki did not materialize, but the Latin American
states, in 1967, negotiated and adopted the Treaty of Tlatelolco, declaring
Latin America and Caribbean a NWFZ. On April 30, 1999, the UN Disarmament
Commission in its report recommended a set of principles for the establishment
of a NWFZ. The guidelines suggested that the initiative for establishing a
geographical zone free of nuclear weapons should emanate from the ‘states
within the region’ and nuclear?weapon
states should be consulted when formulating the relevant protocols to the
treaties so as to ensure their consent for ‘undertaking legally binding
commitments.’ Moreover, the NWFZ will allow the states to make use of nuclear
energy for peaceful, economic and research purposes. As of now, there exist
five NWFZs. Most of the Treaties have a set of protocols that oblige outside
nuclear powers and states that hold territory in the respective zones, like
Spain and France in Africa; Netherlands, France, USA and UK in Latin America,
to commit not to undermine NWFZs by deploying nuclear weapons or undermining
NWFZ through acts in violation of the treaty. In case of SEANWFZ Treaty none of
the internationally recognized nuclear powers has either signed it or verified
it because they object to the inclusion of Continental Shelves and Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs). It is pertinent to reiterate what has already been
alluded to in the afore?mentioned
paras that each treaty establishing a NWFZ includes a Protocol for NPT?recognized nuclear weapons states. The set of
Protocols is besides the Treaty, which is only binding for the states within
the region.

Comparative Analysis of NWFZ Treaties and Their Protocol.   A
comparative analysis of the NWFZ treaties and their protocols can lead one to
the conclusion that strictly legally speaking, Pakistan can become a part of
Treaty of Tlatelolco, committing to its binding principles and guidelines. This
conclusion, inferred from a comparative analysis of the treaty texts and their
respective protocols. Moreover, the legal aspect and Pakistan’s prospects of
becoming a part NSG should be contrasted with the potential cost and strategic
considerations that might fetter Pakistan from joining the Treaty. It is
important to mention that the protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would be
limited to the specified region, as defined in the Treaty. Thus, even though
signing protocol 2 would reinforce Pakistan’s claim to non?proliferation regimes, Pakistan would be
constrained by its political and strategic interests to become part of the NWFZ
of Latin America. As already mentioned, Pakistan is located in a geographical
area which has no relevance to the NWFZ of Latin America. Though there exists a
legal case for Pakistan to become a part of Treaty of Tlatelolco, the official
position of the government is governed by considerations that weigh in favour
of maintaining its current position by not adhering to the guidelines of
Protocol 2. This policy seems to continue in foreseeable future. Pakistan,
given its geographical position and the regional dynamics, is disinclined and
averse to taking a unilateral policy decision that might adversely affect its
strategic interests, giving it no immediate benefits.

4.4 Pakistan’s
Concern over NPT

There are shortcomings in the NPT which are
frequently misused by both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon conditions of
the NPT, and furthermore the non-NPT nuclear weapon states.

4.4.1 To start with, the NPT has been formulated to
the point that, due to the impasse made by the US and previous Soviet Union (at
this point Russia), it doesn’t detail the entire component of the disposal of
nuclear weapons and give surety if the nonnuclear weapon conditions of the NPT
would either remain a section of the treaty or pull back on an additional
standard security condition. There is additionally a sheer nonappearance of
exchange on the exchange of the US nuclear weapons to the US-drove NATO
partners for expanding and ensuring security of NATO partners. In spite of the
lessening of US-exchanged strategic nuclear weapons (TNWs) to a couple of NATO
partners, there are still around 200 TMWs positioned that could be prepared and
conveyed in case of major ordinary war with its adversary. Russia then again
has around 2,000 of TNWs to reinforce its frail ordinary powers. The NPT is
quiet on this point of view. NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Stance Review (DDPR)
as of late featured the significance of NATO-nuclear cooperation in which
nuclear weapons stay to be focal types. The DDPR expressed, “As long as
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear partnership. The incomparable
assurance of the security of the partners is given by the vital nuclear powers
of the union, especially those of the United States.


4.4.2 Second, the arrangements inside the
development of the NPT appear to be obscured and make logical inconsistency for
the future survival of the NPT. For instance, article 1 of the NPT forbids the
nuclear weapon states gathering to the NPT to “attempt not to exchange to
any beneficiary at all nuclear weapons or other nuclear unstable gadgets or
control over such weapons of dangerous gadgets specifically or
indirectly.” Similarly, in understanding with the article 2 of the NPT,
“the non-nuclear weapon states gathering to the treaty embraces not to get
the exchange from any transferor at all of nuclear weapons or, on the other
hand other nuclear dangerous gadgets or of control over such weapons or
dangerous gadgets straightforwardly or indirectly.” The US’s exchange of
innovation and its NATO-drove partners being the beneficiaries of TNWs with
consistence fairly abuse the arrangements of the NPT. Moreover, the current
US-India nuclear arrangement, which includes the exchange of nuclear innovation
to India and urges Russia and Australia to strike the comparative manages
India, is thought to be an infringement of the NPT that, thusly, gives
motivating force to other set up nuclear weapon conditions of the NPT to help
states outside the treaty. in the meantime, both part and non-part conditions
of the NPT can assert the ownership of nuclear innovation for serene purposes
as their “basic right” which, thus, can be changed over into military
purposes as both International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NPT have not
created careful shields strategies due to which part states can cheat.18 On the
one hand, the NPT keeps states from exchanging nuclear weapons and their
related innovation to different states specifically or in a roundabout way,
while on the other, it makes an arrangement for securing the comparative
innovation as an “unavoidable right.”


4.4.3 Third, the NPT makes segregation among
nuclear haves and the poor. It allows the set up nuclear weapon states, for
example, the US, Russia, UK, France, and China to be true blue nuclear weapon
states and denies this authenticity to part conditions of the NPT as well as to
non-part NPT nuclear weapon states.19 It is one of the real deterrents for
non-part NPT nuclear weapon states to sign the treaty. It turns into an escape
clause inside the treaty that could enable different states to create and
procure nuclear weapons.


4.4.4 Fourth, the NPT gives an arrangement of
withdrawal to all its part states. As per the article 10 of the NPT, a part
state “has the privilege to pull back from the Treaty on the off chance
that it chooses that additional conventional occasions, identified with the
topic of this Treaty, have endangered the incomparable enthusiasm of its
country.” This shows: 1) the NPT part state can pull back from the treaty
whenever it considers essential; 2) there is no proviso of discipline in
connection to its withdrawal; 3) the pulled back state can create and procure
nuclear weapons as a result of “the additional common occasion” that
harms the “incomparable enthusiasm” of this state, and 4) any
withdrawal from the NPT for ensuring the national intrigue also, security, in
this manner, building nuclear weapons isn’t considered a sheer infringement of
the NPT. For instance, North Korea pulled back from the NPT in 2003 and created
nuclear weapons innovation in 2006. Iran, being an individual from the NPT, is
creating nuclear weapons for security purposes and could pull back from the NPT
appreciating the Article 10 and goes unpunished.


 Chapter 5


In perspective
of the solid restriction from a few nations, it is likely that the two India
and Pakistan may not be acknowledged into the NSG in the prompt future. In any
case, if the United States by and by constrains the NSG partaking governments,
as it did in 2008, Pakistan would not have any decision but rather to audit its
engagement with the worldwide non-proliferation administration, which is
progressively turning into an apparatus to serve just the interests of real


As a mindful
nuclear state and a nation in critical need of nuclear innovation to meet its
developing vitality needs, Pakistan needs to remain productively drew in with
the worldwide non-proliferation administration, so that alongside China, it
fits the bill for common exchange with different states moreover. All things
considered, this relationship can’t be founded on one-sided duties and


After the
India-particular NSG exclusion in 2008, India purportedly started a development
of its nuclear program. It is trusted that since regular citizen offices were
provided with remote fuel, India had the choice of utilizing its indigenous
reserves for military purposes. This appears to have helped India’s
bomb-production potential, and has irritated provincial adjust. Pakistan should
keep on taking measures to guarantee that vital solidness is kept up, without
getting into a weapons contest;


The other
alternative for Pakistan could be to begin a conciliatory battle to persuade
the NSG individuals from its needs and capacities, and all the while feature
India’s non-adherence of the guarantees made as a component of the nuclear
manage the United States;


Pakistan should
proceed nuclear participation with China, while likewise concentrating on
monetary improvement to pull in other nuclear merchants to investigate business
benefits in the nation;


Pakistan too
ought not sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) unless it is guaranteed that its vital intrigue and
territorial security will be dealt with;


Pakistan ought
not offer in to Western “twofold models”, and continue requiring an
unprejudiced criteria-based approach for incorporation into the NSG gathering;


Last yet not the
slightest, Pakistan can sit tight for a more suitable time to secure
participation, while it keeps on pursuing a regulating way to deal with
universal non-proliferation endeavours.

Long Term Recommendations

Pakistan need to
embrace more proactive outside approach and strategy to cook the help for
Pakistan’s offered in nuclear gathering. Despite the fact that China’s
authentic position bolster the Pakistan’s candidature however it is vital for
Pakistan to keep up its flexibility and maintainability in its procedure with
respect to enrollment of nuclear cartel. In such manner Pakistan should begin a
discretionary crusade to persuade the other NSG individuals from its needs and


engagement and need to extend itself as an awesome economic motivator for
different states. Therefore, Pakistan should consent to arrangement for common
nuclear collaboration with different states, while concentrating on economic
advance to pull in other nuclear sellers to find business points of interest in
the nation.


In future, U.S.

what’s more, India will expanded their endeavours to persuade part states
including china to help India’s enrolment application without considering the
effect of such strategies on South Asian key steadiness and worldwide endeavours
of Non-proliferation. In like manner, knowing India’s incredible endeavours to
exasperate the Balance of energy in district, it is vital for Pakistan to take
measures to upgrade its abilities with a specific end goal to guarantee that
vital strength and provincial security.